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Because of the widespread confusion arising from the earlier cases,-
a method was necessary whereby the vacillations and contradictions
could be put to an end. It would seem that the intent and objective
test is such a method. As seen, the test is capable of holding its own
against any legitimate criticism. The test has been readily applicable
in the cases that have arisen thus far, although no case has been re-
ported which has been capable of testing its utmost flexibility. Some
imaginative and complex courses of criminal conduct have been
suggested in dissenting opinions which, it is maintained, will show
the fallibility of the test." Nevertheless, until such a magical
criminal combination of events is transformed into the facts of a
genuine case, the test is capable of meeting all conventional fact
situations. In truth, can any test be asked to do more? When that
exceptional case does arise which contains an extended range of
offenses, all committed under the guise of one intent and objective,
the intent and objective test will have to be carefully revisited. It
will then be learned whether the accused's stated singular intent will
reign over a more restrictive interpretation of the test that would
place practical limits upon the bounds of criminal conduct. When
the court's conscience becomes shocked with the multiplicity of
crimes involved, legal logicality would demand that the test be
deemed inapplicable and a standard of punishment to match the
defendant's criminal liability be substituted.
James W. Cardwell
Constitutional Law - Right to Court Appointed Counsel
for Indigent Defendants in Noncapital Cases - Applied
to State Proceedings Through the Fourteenth Amendment
Petitioner was convicted in a Florida state court of breaking and
entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, which under Florida
law is a felony.1 The judge, acting in accordance with Florida law,'
refused the indigent petitioner's request for counsel. At the trial
Petitioner claimed that the court's refusal to appoint counsel was a
"See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
41 People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 449, 466 (1962); Seiterle v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal. 2d 397, 369 P.2d 697, 700-01 (1962); Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357
P.2d 839, 847-48 (1960).
'Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.05 (1961).
'Fla. Stat. Ann. § 909.21 (1961) states: "In all capital cases where the defendant is
insolvent, the judge shall appoint such counsel for the defendant as he shall deem neces-
sary .... " (Emphasis added.) See also Watson v. State, 142 Fla. 218, 194 So. 640 (1940).
[Vol. 18
violation of his rights under the United States Constitution, but
proceeded to present his own defense. Petitioner was convicted and
sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. He filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court in which he claimed a
constitutional right to court appointed counsel. The petition was
denied without opinion.' Certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then appointed counsel and
instructed both petitioner and respondent to discuss the following
question: "Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 be reconsidered?"' Held, reversed and remanded: The sixth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
assistance of counsel in his defense, is fundamental and essential to a
fair trial and is made obligatory on the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.! Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
The problem whether a defendant in a criminal action has a right
to legal counsel is one that has been at issue in the common law for
centuries.! The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
clearly states that such a right exists in the United States.! Initially,
there was disagreement among lawyers and judges as to whether the
"right to counsel" merely insured the defendant's right to retain
counsel in criminal cases if he so desired or whether the "right" was
to demand that counsel be appointed by the court if the defendant
could not afford to retain counsel.' In Johnson v. Zerbst' the Supreme
Court settled the dispute by holding that in federal court, where the
sixth amendment is applicable, the indigent defendant has a right
to demand that the court appoint counsel for him and that a refusal
of his demand would result in the conviction being void. This rule
was later interpreted to mean that counsel had to be provided at all
stages of the trial" and that it was not limited to cases involving
serious offenses."
'Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961).4 Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
'Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, expressly limits the right to counsel to cases involving
the possibility of a substantial prison sentence. He specifically stated that the question of
whether the rule in the instant case should extend to all criminal cases need not now be
decided. 372 U.S. at 351. The majority opinion does not indicate such a limitation.
' IV Blackstone, Commentaries 354-55 (1807).
U.S. Const. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
8Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660-63 (1948); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464-69
(1942).
9 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
'"Edwards v. United States, 139 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 769
(1944).
"Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cit. 1942).
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Gideon v. Wainwright concerns a defendant's rights in state courts.
The Bill of Rights is not applicable to state court procedures."5
Therefore, when attacking a state statute as being violative of federal
constitutional rights, the petitioner usually bases his claim on the
due process or equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment puts no restrictions on the state court's
procedure unless the procedure is discriminatory or an invasion of a
"fundamental" right." Thus, the Court must decide, in a given
situation, whether a certain right is fundamental and, consequently,
cannot be denied the defendant by the states, or whether it is not
essential and fundamental to a fair trial and, therefore, should
be left to the discretion of the states. It has been contended that
all of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are "fundamen-
tal," and thus the first eight amendments should be incorporated
into the fourteenth. " This view has not prevailed, but on various
occasions the Court has considered the right involved in a particular
case "fundamental" and thus protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. By this case-by-case method various
rights contained in the Bill of Rights have been included in the
rights protected by the fourteenth amendment.1' The principal case
is an example of such a decision.
In the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama the Supreme Court first
applied the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
question of the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings."6 The
Court, stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not dis-
charged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances
"5Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
"aAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
14 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). "Since the adoption of that Amendment
[fourteen], ten Justices have felt that it protects from infringment by the States the
privileges, protections, and safeguards granted by the Bill of Rights. . . . Unfortunately it
has never commander a Court." Id. at oDE. See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
71-72 (1946).
" The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional the criminal procedure in state
courts in the following cases: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (refusal to provide indigent de-
fendants with free transcripts of the trial); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(coerced confessions); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (perjured testimony);
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (mob domination of the jury).
14287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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NOTES
as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial
of the case.'
In 1942 in Betts v. Brady"8 the Court made it clear that in non-
capital, as well as capital, cases due process would require a state court
to appoint counsel under circumstances in which the defendant was
incapable of adequately defending himself. The Court stated that
the right to counsel in state courts was not a "fundamental" right
unless the defendant for some reason could not prepare and present
his own defense. In Betts the defendant was charged with robbery.
The Court labeled him of "ordinary intelligence" because he had
pleaded guilty and been sentenced in a previous criminal case with-
out aid of counsel and, therefore, was "not wholly unfamiliar with
court procedure." Under these conditions the Court upheld his con-
viction on the ground that he was not prejudiced by the absence
of counsel. This standard for determining the necessity of defense
counsel in noncapital cases was widely accepted by the states."'
Later, the Court reconsidered what was to be termed fundamental
in capital cases and decided that the fourteenth amendment required
the state court to appoint counsel for all indigent defendants, regard-
less of their ability to defend themselves.' This extension left the
Betts decision intact because the rule was extended only to capital
offenses. However, these cases led the way for the Gideon v. Wain-
right decision since from the decisions in these cases the decision
in the principal case is but one more logical step in a previously
indicated direction. The Court has in the past refused to distinguish
between capital and noncapital offenses in cases involving constitu-
tional rights in criminal procedure. 1 In Gideon a unanimous Court
declared that the right of the defendant to counsel in any criminal
action is a "fundamental" right and that the violation of this right
by a state court is contrary to the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Gideon seems to place the federal court standards
of Johnson v. Zerbst"2 upon the state courts."3 These standards would
17 Id. at 71.
s316 U.S. 455 (1942).
"See, e.g., Cook v. State, 32 Al. App. 168, 22 So. 2d 924 (1945); Allen v. Common-
wealth, 324 Mass. 558, 87 N.E.2d 192 (1949); People v. Haddad, 306 Mich. 556, 11 N.W.2d
240 (1943); Stanfield v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 324, 212 S.W.2d 516 (1948).
2 In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), the Court stated: "When one pleads
to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether preju-
dice resulted." See also Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948).
"1 Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
22 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This case provided for right to counsel in all federal criminal
cases.
23372 U.S. 335 (1963).
We have construed this [the sixth amendment] to mean that in federal
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require the appointment of competent counsel 4 in all criminal cases"
in which the defendant is, in fact, indigent." Moreover, if federal
standards apply, counsel must be appointed as soon as the defendant
is indicted, and there must be an attorney representing the de-
fendant at every stage of the trial 7 and appeal." However, a de-
cision rendered against a defendant with no counsel would be valid
if the defendant had expressly waived the right to counsel, but the
trial court would have an obligation to inform the accused of his
right to counsel and if the accused waived his right, to see the
waiver was competently made.29
One important question was not answered by the Court: Will the
doctrine of Gideon v. Wainwright be applied only prospectively or
will the Court declare this rule to be retroactive in its application? If
the Court applies the rule only prospectively, convictions rendered
under the Betts rule will be unaffected. On the other hand a retro-
active application of this decision would allow defendants who were
convicted without aid of counsel under the old Betts rule and before
to contest their convictions by writ of habeas corpus in federal
court."0 The defendants could claim that at the time of their con-
viction their constitutional right to counsel was denied them by an
incorrect interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.
If the Supreme Court were to apply the doctrine of Gideon retro-
actively, it would not be without precedent in so doing. In Eskridge
v. Washington State Prison Board"2 the Court applied their decision
courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless
the right is competently and intelligently waived. . . . We think the Court in
Belts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill
of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal
abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 339-41.
24Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1948). The
states have differing opinions as to what constitutes competent counsel. See Annot., 74
A.L.R.2d 1390; see also Ex parte Lovelady, 152 Tex. Crim. 93, 207 S.W.2d 396, cert. denied,
333 U.S. 879 (1948); Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 874 (1945).
"fBute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660-63 (1948); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
26United States v. Sampson, 161 F. Supp. 216 (D.D.C. 1958).27 Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963); Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d
794 (8th Cir. 1956); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 892 (1950).
2 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565
(1957).
29 No defendant will be forced to accept counsel, but the Court will reverse a conviction
if it believes that the defendant's waiver was due to youth, ignorance, or insanity. See
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Marino v.
Ragan, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
"
5Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
3' 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
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in Griffin v. Illinois"3 to reverse a conviction over twenty years
old." The Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, " which provided for
counsel in all federal criminal cases, has also been applied retroactively
by lower courts. 5 The problem of retroactive application is also of
major importance in connection with the Court's decision in Mapp v.
Ohio,"s which dealt with convictions obtained in state courts by using
illegally obtained evidence. To date, the Supreme Court has not ap-
plied the Mapp rule retroactively, and there is a difference of opin-
ion among the lower court judges as to whether the Court will do
so in the future."
If the Gideon case is applied retroactively, it will cause a great
amount of litigation in the criminal courts of many states. In Gideon
the state contended that if such a rule should be applied retroactively,
some 5093 prisoners in Florida might be eligible to contest their con-
victions." The adverse effect that such circumstances would have
upon the administration of justice is patent. However, the weight
given these adverse circumstances cannot begin to balance the in-
justice done to indigent defendants who are now in prison because of
their inability adequately to defend themselves. In the principal case
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him. . . . Betts was an anachronism when
handed down .... "
Considering the implication of this reasoning and the action taken
by the Court to date, it seems highly probable that the Gideon rule
is to be applied retroactively. Both state and lower federal courts have
32 351 U.S. 12 (1956). This case made it mandatory for the states to provide trial trans-
cripts free of charge to all indigent defendants who need them for appeal. The Court based
its decision upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
" This retroactive application was protested by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
Whittaker and was done despite a plea by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Griffin v. Illinois to
apply the rule declared there only prospectively. See also a discussion of the problem by Mr.
Justice Cardozo in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932).
4 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 1
" Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Calif. 1943).
36 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Con-
stitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 650 (1962).
" United States v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317
F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963); People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E.2d 99 (1962).
But see Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 809 (1963).
"SBrief for Respondent, p. 56, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3' 372 U.S. at 344-45.
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handed down decisions applying the rule. In these cases, as in the
cases involving the Mapp rule,' the courts have divided as to whether
the rule should apply to previous convictions.4' The Supreme Court,
on the other hand, has shown clearly its attitude by treating cases
involving previous convictions in the same manner as the direct ap-
peals by reversing them "in light of this Court's decision in Gideon
v. Wainwright."' The decision in the principal case creates an even
greater susceptibility to post-conviction collateral attack than the
decision in the Mapp case because in right-to-counsel cases waiver of
the right will not be presumed by silence in the record," whereas in
cases involving the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, some
indication of an unreasonable search and seizure must be present in
the record." If these precedents and this reasoning are followed, it
seems highly probable that 5093 prisoners in Florida and thousands
more in other states4 could have an opportunity for another day in
court.
Whether or not the Gideon case is applied retroactively, the de-
cision will certainly have far-reaching effects on the action of state
40 See note 37 suPra and accompanying text.
" United States v. Fay, 219 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Commonwealth v. Ban-
miller, 410 Pa. 584, 189 A.2d 875 (1963). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has ap-
plied the Gideon decision retroactively and has granted new trials in Ex Parte Hope,
-Tex. Crim., 374 S.W.2d 441 (1964) and Ex parste Parsons, _-_Tex. Crim-, 374
S.W.2d 442 (1964).
4' See, e.g., Davis v. Banmiller, 374 U.S. 489 (1963); Walker v. Walker, 374 U.S. 488
(1963). The Court has not yet expressly stated that it will apply the doctrine of Gideon
retroactively in all cases in the future. In Picklesimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963),
after the majority had reversed a pre-Gideon conviction in a memorandum opinion, Mr.
Justice Harlan stated:
I am unable to agree with the Court's summary disposition of these 10 Florida
cases, and believe that the federal question which they present in common is
deserving of full-dress consideration. . . . [I]t seems to me that the question
whether the States are constitutionally required to apply the new rule
retrospectively, which may well require the reopening of cases long since ad-
judicated in accordance with then applicable decisions of this Court, is one that
should be decided only after informed and deliberate consideration. . . .In the
current swift pace of constitutional change, the time has come for this Court
to deal definitely with this important and far-reaching subject.
'Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Smith v. United States, 216 F.2d 724
(5th Cir. 1954).
44Bender, supra note 36, at 657. Also, United States v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1963), held that Mapp v. Ohio would not be applied retroactively because the objective of
the decision in that case was the prospective deterrance of officers in contrast with the object
of Griffin v. Illinois which was fairness of procedure. This reasoning leaves open the door of
that court for a retroactive application of Gideon.
"s The respondent contended that the decision in the principal case would overrule de-
cisions to the contrary in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Brief
for Respondent, p. 71, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
